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"Our supplier does that for us" is not an answer: a former inspector on what the GSC actually tests

Writer: Kevin Jones
Kevin Jones
26 minutes ago
11 min read

Tommy Corlett spent nine years at the Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission (GSC), most recently as Senior Inspector for AML/CFT Inspections, before joining SolutionsHub as Head of Regulatory Assurance and Remediation. He explains what inspectors actually test, where operators' controls tend to fail, and what separates passing an inspection from being compliant.


Gaming Eminence interview: Tommy Corlett, SolutionsHub, former Isle of Man GSC inspector

Regulators do not take an operator's word that its controls work. They ask for evidence, and much of that evidence now sits inside systems the operator did not build.


Tommy Corlett has spent most of the past decade asking for it. He joined the Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission (GSC) as a Gaming Inspector and moved into AML/CFT Inspections as Senior Inspector in November 2023. In October 2026 he joined SolutionsHub as Head of Regulatory Assurance and Remediation.


Here he sets out how an inspection is built, what an inspector needs to see before accepting that outsourced monitoring works, and what separates a credible remediation plan from a weak one.



How an inspection takes shape


Gaming Eminence: The GSC describes its AML/CFT inspections as a self-assessment combined with a practical assessment on site. When you worked through a sample of files, what were you testing against, and when did it usually become clear whether the framework on paper matched what happened to real customers?


Tommy Corlett: "The GSC supervises AML/CFT compliance through a combination of self-assessments and onsite inspections. The AML/CFT self-assessment involves a review of an operator's AML/CFT policies and procedures, while the onsite inspection assesses how those policies and procedures operate in practice through testing and discussions with key personnel.


The typical process for a full AML/CFT inspection begins with the AML/CFT Inspections Team contacting the operator to arrange a mutually convenient date for the onsite inspection. This initial engagement would normally take place at least six to eight weeks before the proposed inspection date.


Once an inspection date has been agreed, the operator will be required to submit a completed AML/CFT self-assessment together with a customer database sample. The AML/CFT Inspections Team will provide a deadline for submission well ahead of the onsite inspection.


The scope of the customer sample request will depend on the operator's licence type (B2B or B2C). The AML/CFT Inspector will review the initial customer sample and select customers for detailed examination based on various risk factors. These may include high-risk customers, high-value depositing or withdrawing customers, customers located in higher-risk jurisdictions, politically exposed persons (PEPs), or customers who have been subject to a disclosure. The operator will then be required to provide all information held in relation to the selected customers, well ahead of the onsite inspection.


Upon receipt of the completed AML/CFT self-assessment and customer database sample, the lead AML/CFT Inspector will commence their review of the information provided.


Operators are assessed against AML/CFT legislation, OGRA licence conditions and AML/CFT Guidance Notes. The AML/CFT self-assessment is structured around ten AML/CFT topics, and this framework is typically used by AML/CFT Inspectors throughout the inspection process. Operators should therefore be familiar with the areas relevant to their business model and have a clear understanding of what to expect during the onsite inspection. There should be no surprises.


In my experience, once the pre-inspection information has been received and reviewed, an initial picture begins to emerge as to whether the inspection is likely to progress smoothly or whether areas of concern may require further scrutiny.


First impressions are important. The AML/CFT Inspections Team will begin forming views well before the onsite inspection takes place. For example, difficulties in contacting an operator, delays in agreeing an inspection date, excessive back-and-forth correspondence, or failure to meet pre-inspection deadlines may all create a negative initial impression. In my experience, such issues have, in certain cases, resulted in inspections being escalated.


The customer sample review is a particularly important element of the AML/CFT Inspector's assessment. Where there is missing information, inaccurate records or poorly documented due diligence, it is likely to generate additional questions, either before or during the onsite inspection. Conversely, where customer records are complete, accurate and clearly documented, the inspection process is likely to proceed more efficiently.


In conclusion, the AML/CFT Inspector starts to form an opinion on the Operator and inspection before the onsite inspection. An Operator who engages early with the AML/CFT inspection team, provides a complete and detailed self-assessment and meets the deadlines for the pre-inspection materials will put themselves in the best position for a smooth AML/CFT onsite inspection."



Monitoring the operator did not build


Gaming Eminence: In a February 2026 public statement, the GSC found that an operator could not show it had carried out ongoing monitoring in line with its own procedures, and had not kept records of its automated transaction monitoring analysis outside the system that produced them. Much of that monitoring now runs on supplier platforms. What does an inspector need to see before accepting that monitoring is working, and what should an operator be able to explain about rules and alerts it did not build itself?


Tommy Corlett: "Ongoing Monitoring is a key area of any AML/CFT inspection. Operators must be able to demonstrate to the Inspectorate that ongoing and periodic monitoring activities are being conducted in accordance with their AML/CFT framework. Evidence of ongoing monitoring should be available either within the pre-inspection document pack and customer database sample or during the onsite inspection itself.


Prior to the onsite inspection, the AML/CFT Inspection Team will review the Operator's AML/CFT policies and procedures relating to ongoing monitoring. This review forms part of the assessment of the Operator's AML/CFT framework and is intended to determine whether the documented controls align with the requirements of the Gambling (AML/CFT) Code and the AML/CFT Guidance Notes.


The onsite inspection and customer database sample give the operator the opportunity to demonstrate how ongoing monitoring is conducted and evidenced in a live operating environment.


The GSC is an evidence-based regulator. If an Operator cannot demonstrate that ongoing monitoring is taking place through documented reviews, scrutiny, or monitoring activities within the customer database sample, or during the onsite inspection, the Inspectorate may conclude that ongoing monitoring is not being performed effectively.


Simply saying "our supplier does that for us" is not sufficient.

A review of the GSC's published AML/CFT enforcement cases identified five public notices arising from AML/CFT inspections. Of these, three included concerns relating to ongoing monitoring. This suggests that ongoing monitoring remains an area where Operators commonly experience weaknesses and where improvements can often be made.


Based on my experience of AML/CFT inspections, the most common deficiencies relating to ongoing monitoring arise where Operators fail to follow their own AML/CFT policies and procedures or, in more serious cases, are unable to demonstrate that monitoring activities are taking place at all.


An AML/CFT Inspector will look beyond whether a supplier's platform exists. The Operator must show that it is meeting its ongoing monitoring obligations. The responsibility always remains with the licence holder, even where the monitoring activity is outsourced.


When I was conducting inspections, I would want to see evidence that the Operator understands how the monitoring solution works and how it aligns with its risk assessments. Simply saying "our supplier does that for us" is not sufficient.


I would expect to see documented technology risk assessments covering third-party systems, appropriate due diligence, a rationale for thresholds and monitoring frequencies, evidence that alerts are being investigated, management reports identifying trends and periodic testing to tune the monitoring rules. The Operator should also retain appropriate records of its transaction-monitoring analysis and decisions outside the supplier's system, so they remain available as evidence. This would all need to be overseen by the AML/CFT Compliance Officer or MLRO."



When a high-risk rating changes nothing


Gaming Eminence: Published GSC findings include customer risk assessments that left out relevant risk factors or were not reviewed regularly, and accounts that stayed open, or were reopened, without enhanced due diligence being completed. In your experience, is the weakness usually in how the risk model is designed, or in whether a higher risk rating actually changes what happens to the customer?


Tommy Corlett: "The Customer Risk Assessment (CRA) is an integral part of the Operator's risk-based approach. It enables the Operator to focus its finite resources on the customers most likely to present money laundering or terrorist financing risks.


As part of an AML/CFT inspection, the AML/CFT Inspector will review the Operator's CRA methodology to ensure that it aligns with the relevant legislation and AML/CFT Guidance Notes. The AML/CFT Inspector will also review a sample of customer files to assess whether the Operator's CRA process has been applied consistently and in accordance with the methodology.


The legislation is clear on the mandatory risk factors that must be incorporated into the design of a CRA. The CRA should be reviewed regularly as part of the Operator's risk-based approach. It is important that the Operator can evidence and provide a satisfactory rationale for the risk rating assigned to each customer.


In my experience, both issues arise. A CRA model may be poorly designed, or a customer's high-risk rating may not result in enhanced controls.


"What changes when a customer becomes high risk?"

An Operator's CRA should be given appropriate care and attention. A poorly designed risk model may fail to identify higher-risk customers in the first place. However, even a well-designed risk assessment has limited value if a higher-risk rating does not result in enhanced controls. The real purpose of the CRA is to drive risk-based decision making; a customer classified as high-risk should be subject to a different level of scrutiny than a low-risk customer. For example, a customer may be correctly identified as high risk because of their jurisdiction and transactional behaviour, yet the account continues to transact while the required enhanced due diligence remains outstanding. This issue is not the design of the risk model but a failure in the operational controls.


A common CRA failure that I observed during my time with the AML/CFT Inspections Team was the use of a template, off-the-shelf methodology. Every Operator is different, whether through the products offered, customer demographics, payment methods, or jurisdictions targeted. Consequently, the CRA methodology should be tailored to the specific risks and characteristics of the Operator. The use of a generic methodology may result in customer risks being assessed inaccurately, which can adversely affect not only the CRA process itself but also other areas of the business.


Ultimately, the question I would be asking the clients is "What changes when a customer becomes high risk?". If the answer is "not much", then the problem is unlikely to be the risk model alone. It is that the Operator is not fully operating its risk-based approach."



Why monitoring and testing keeps failing


Gaming Eminence: A failure to show adequate monitoring and testing of AML/CFT compliance appears in four of the five civil penalty statements the GSC has published since October 2024. Why does this control fail so often, and what does credible testing look like in practice?


Tommy Corlett: "It is a requirement in AML/CFT legislation that all licensed operators establish, document, maintain, and operate appropriate procedures and controls to monitor and test compliance with AML/CFT requirements.


The legislation also requires operators to appoint a suitable person as the AML/CFT Compliance Officer. One of the key responsibilities of this role is to oversee the monitoring and testing of the operator's compliance with the AML/CFT Code.


It is essential that the individual appointed to this position can demonstrate appropriate expertise and competence in anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and countering proliferation financing (AML/CFT/CPF) requirements, gambling-related risk typologies, and a thorough understanding of the operator's AML/CFT/CPF policies, procedures, and systems. The legislation further requires a suitable person to possess sufficient seniority, adequate time to perform the role effectively, and direct access to the operator's officers.


Drawing on my experience within the AML/CFT Inspections Team, one of the most common deficiencies identified was a lack of sufficient time and resources for the AML/CFT Compliance Officer to properly discharge their responsibilities. This is often seen in start-up Operators where the individual may also hold other key roles, such as Designated Official or director.


In many cases, Operators had established appropriate procedures and controls; however, these were not consistently followed due to resource constraints or competing priorities.


My recommendation to operators is, where possible, to appoint an individual who is independent from the operator's day-to-day commercial functions and to provide them with sufficient support and resources to fulfil their AML/CFT Compliance Officer duties effectively. Where this is not feasible, operators should consider commissioning periodic independent audits. This can be particularly valuable where the AML/CFT Compliance Officer cannot be entirely free from conflicts of interest or where existing resources are insufficient to provide adequate oversight.


The AML/CFT Compliance Officer is required by legislation to report to the senior management on the Operator's AML/CFT compliance at least annually. However, in my experience, a programme of ongoing monitoring and testing conducted throughout the year is far more effective than relying on a single annual review.


As a matter of best practice, AML/CFT/CPF testing should be divided into two key components: technical compliance and effectiveness testing. Technical compliance focuses on determining whether policies, procedures, and training arrangements remain aligned with current AML/CFT/CPF requirements. Effectiveness testing, on the other hand, assesses whether those controls are operating as intended through sample reviews, file testing, and checks of staff understanding.


My personal recommendation for maintaining technical compliance is to make use of the GSC's AML/CFT Self-Assessment as a benchmarking tool. If you can confidently demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out within the self-assessment, you are likely to be well-positioned to meet the expectations of the legislation, licence conditions, and AML Guidance Notes."



What a credible remediation plan contains


Gaming Eminence: The GSC has said remediation is its preferred route. Beyond engaging early and openly, what did a credible remediation plan contain that a weak one did not?


Tommy Corlett: "Once a final report has been issued by the AML/CFT Inspections Team, it is likely to contain a number of action points, each accompanied by a deadline for completion.


The timeframes assigned to these actions are set according to the work involved.


The AML/CFT Inspections Team does not provide specific guidance on how remediation plans should be structured or implemented. However, it is expected that all actions are completed within the prescribed timeframes. As such, it is the responsibility of the Operator to determine how the actions will be remediated and managed.


In my experience, the most effective remediation plans are developed by Operators who engage with the AML/CFT Inspections Team at an early stage and maintain an open and transparent dialogue with the AML/CFT Inspector regarding progress against the actions. A detailed plan should analyse the causes of the issues, name accountable owners, set measurable outcomes and include independent validation. This gives the AML/CFT Inspector confidence that the deficiencies will be addressed effectively and sustainably.


It is also important for the Operator to manage the AML/CFT Inspector's expectations. If it becomes apparent that an action cannot be completed within the agreed timeframe, the Operator should engage with the Inspector as early as possible to discuss an extension. In my experience, the AML/CFT Inspections Team is generally willing to grant reasonable extensions where a satisfactory justification is provided.


Conversely, where an Operator fails to engage with the AML/CFT Inspections Team or does not complete the required actions within the agreed timeframes, the matter may be referred to the GSC's Enforcement Team for consideration of regulatory or enforcement action."



Passing an inspection versus being compliant


Gaming Eminence: You now help firms prepare for the kind of inspection you used to carry out. What is the difference between preparing a business to pass an inspection and making it compliant, and what are you likely to tell clients that they will not want to hear?


Tommy Corlett: "Operators must understand their regulatory obligations and, importantly, ensure they are adhered to in practice. One of the most common mistakes I have observed is that meaningful action is only taken once notification of an inspection lands in an Operator's inbox.


There is a significant difference between preparing a business to pass an inspection and making it genuinely compliant. An Operator can often present well during an inspection through good documentation and well-prepared staff members, which looks impressive on the surface, but the underlying controls are weak and ineffective. True compliance means showing how the Operator's policies, procedures and systems are embedded in day-to-day operations. There will inevitably be occasions when I highlight issues that a client may not wish to hear. For example, Operators do not want to hear that their policies are well written but staff do not follow them, or that management information is produced but nobody acts on it.


During my time within the AML/CFT Inspections Team, it was often clear which Operators had built their frameworks to manage AML/CFT risks and which had built them mainly to satisfy an inspection.


One of my key responsibilities is to prepare Operators for upcoming regulatory inspections. I conduct reviews with a regulator's mindset, applying an evidence-based approach that is consistent with the methodology a regulator would be expected to take. My role is to identify potential gaps in processes and controls and provide practical remediation plans before a regulatory inspection takes place.


When supporting clients today, my objective is not to help them pass an inspection. It is to help them identify weaknesses before the regulator does and build a framework that can withstand scrutiny at any time. Most importantly, I will tell clients that compliance cannot sit solely with the AML/CFT Compliance Officer or MLRO. The strongest Operators are those where AML/CFT risk ownership exists throughout the business and the tone comes from the top.


If a business is genuinely compliant, a successful inspection should be a tap in."



Tommy Corlett is Head of Regulatory Assurance and Remediation at SolutionsHub. He spent nine years at the Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission, most recently as Senior Inspector for AML/CFT Inspections.

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